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Ordre, sécurité et droits humains 
The Militarized Society and 
the Law 
Caésar ESPIRITU * 
La sauvegarde de la sécurité nationale est le prétexte le plus souvent 
avancé par certains pays pour justifier la militarisation de leur société. Dans 
nombre de pays en voie de développement, c'est au nom de la sécurité 
nationale que les droits humains les plus fondamentaux sont bafoués. 
La doctrine de la sécurité nationale fournit la base idéologique d'une 
conception de l'État opposant ce dernier à la collectivité des pouvoirs. La loi 
martiale engendre sa propre logique inconciliable avec celle qui soutend les 
droits humains, notamment dans les pays du sud-est asiatique où les droits 
humains ne sont pas constitutionnalisés. 
L'auteur traite de la protection des droits humains dans les Etats 
militarisés et plus spécifiquement aux Philippines, où l'arrivée au pouvoir du 
gouvernement actuel permet d'espérer l'instauration d'une véritable 
démocratie conciliant les exigences du développement et le respect des droits 
humains. 
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Individual freedom versus national security is the issue in Western 
democracies. The issue is even more complex in developing countries. 
There, human rights are almost anathema to the concept of national 
security, in spite of the fact that the preamble of the United Nations Charter 
states in its second clause: "We, the peoples of the United Nations, 
determined 'to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights...' while the very 
first purpose of the United Nations under Article 1 of the Charter is "to 
maintain international peace and security..." 
Introduction : Militarization of Societies 
The obvious inconsistency between the observance of order and security 
and respect for human rights finds concrete manifestation in the 
"militarization" of many societies of our world today. As a result, in many 
instances, there is no legitimate authority left within the state structure to 
forestall abuse of power and authority. In many developing countries — there 
are a few notable exceptions, of course — people have been tortured, held 
without trial, and often butchered on grounds of national security. They thus 
come to live in a state of constant fear and terror. 
The growth of militarization has created a political environment in 
which the sharing of decisions in political processes has been precluded. As 
guardians of the ruling class, men in uniform decree what is right or wrong. 
Force is used to arbitrate disputes or conflicts of opinion, and organized 
violence has become an essential ingredient of the apparatus of power in the 
name of national security. 
1. Militarized Societies: Links and Effects 
1.1. The "Doctrine" of National Security 
In the Philippines, the militarization of the country was given an 
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"doctrine" of national security. This doctrine, which provides the theoretical 
raison d'être of many contemporary military regimes in Latin America, has 
inexorably led to the surrender of civil liberties to what may be called the 
National Security State through the institutionalization of states of exception 
or martial law. In some parts of Latin America, it is hardly coincidental that 
defense lawyers, judges, priests and intellectuals who have advocated respect 
for fundamental rights through peaceful means have been the object of 
official repression. 
The doctrine of national security provides the ideological basis for the 
effort of state institutions to construct what may be called "the organic 
conception of the state". A state is to appear as a living being above social 
classes and above individuals, with its own dimensions and capacity to define 
its own goals. This state, with its own will and its own aims, is opposed to a 
conception of society composed of people ; indeed, the notion of people (they 
are the ultimate repository of sovereignty in the democratic theory) is 
rejected ; if anything, they are considered internal enemies. 
1.2. "Trade-Off" Between Rights and Development 
At the present, and all through the remaining years of this century, most 
countries of the Third World will be obsessed with their development efforts. 
For many of them, the obvious linkage between development and human 
rights lies in the visible downgrading of civil and political rights in order to 
achieve order, stability and economic growth. This is the logical offshoot of 
the idea so popular among authoritarian rulers that developing countries 
cannot afford the luxury of promoting both civil and political rights on the 
one hand and economic rights on the other. The argument is that since the 
fundamental right is that of economic security which can be secured only by 
pursuing a "growth first" strategy, then a diminution of civil and political 
rights on the one hand and economic rights on the other hand becomes 
imperative. People are made to believe that this is the only way the "higher 
right" of the people to economic security can be safeguarded. 
For the political and economic elites in many developing societies, if 
hydroelectric dams are necessary for economic development, then surely they 
would have to be constructed even if this should mean tribal genocide for 
indigenous minorities. If export trade zones have to be created for, say, 
Canadian multinationals, it should not matter if women are exploited with 
their wages kept at near-starvation levels. If foreign investments have to be 
attracted, it should not matter if strikes are banned and unions, disbanded. If 
modern commercial agriculture has to be established in the name of export-
led growth, the use of violence by state agencies to terrorize farmers into 
giving up their small landholdings should be countenanced. 
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In the meantime, violations of the integrity of the human person — 
extrajudicial killings, tortures, arbitrary arrests — coupled with violations of 
individual freedoms — of speech, of assembly, of associations — as well as 
denials of due process and restrictions on the privileges of the writ of habeas 
corpus are fostered. 
1.3. Throwing out the Principle of Checks and Balances 
Let us look at the Philippine situation again. 
The idea of checks and balances was slowly allowed to fade away under 
martial law in the Philippines. The National Assembly was weakened to the 
point of subservience and impotence. 
Of course, the same thing could be said of the judiciary under martial 
law. 
The former President claimed absolute powers, rather than powers 
subject to checks and balances. He said : 
It must be borne in mind that once martial law is proclaimed, all the powers of 
government are of necessity assumed by the authority that administers the 
martial law, and the operation of the regular government, including its 
legislature and the judiciary, is subjected to its imperatives. Of course, the 
Constitution itself is not ousted, but by the power of the Constitution itself 
vested in the Executive to issue the proclamation, it yields the application and 
effects of some of its provisions to the demands of the situation, as the 
administrator may in his bona fide judgment so determine. 
With the President laid this claim to executive supremacy, the judiciary 
rationalized its own powers along the same line. Thus, in a famous case 
(Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile) in 1983, the Supreme court said in self-
depreciation : 
The Supreme Court can, with becoming modesty, ill afford to assume the 
authority to check or reverse or supplant the presidential actions. On these 
occasions, the President takes absolute command, for the very life of the nation 
and its government which, incidentally, includes the courts, is in grave peril. In 
so doing, the President is answering only to his conscience, the people, and to 
God. 
2. The Rule and Roles of Law 
2.1. Rule of Law? 
In spite of this, some eminent jurists did claim that the rule of law was 
observed during the martial law years. Like you in this conference, our people 
are used to worshipping on the altar of the rule of law. 
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According to an eminent Chief Justice of our Supreme Court, who 
retired only in 1985, there were "guiding principles which covered the 
application of martial law — the old landmarks of the law were still there to 
serve as guides and the precedents were there to serve as guarantees for 
continuity. 
Beautiful words. Because of the guiding principles, he continued, the rule 
of law had been scrupulously observed during the emergency rule in the 
Philippines. 
The Chief Justice supports his claim that the rule of law had been 
observed during emergency rule in the Philippines in these words : 
... What we have, in the language of President Marcos, is constitutional 
authoritarianism... There is emphasis on the role of authority, but there is no 
disregard of the limitations of the Constitution as found in both the present and 
the past Charters. What is more, martial rule itself under the conditions therein 
set forth was itself recognized as a mode of coping with emergency conditions... 
It is my submission that a dispassionate appraisal of the Philippines'experience 
yields the conclusion of the observance of the traditional concept of the rule of 
law. The power that the government exercises is traceable to its interpretation of 
the Constitution and applicable jural norms. There is no obstacle to its acts 
being challenged in court. It cannot be said, therefore, that under martial rule, 
the Philippines has departed from its long-standing tradition of adherence to 
the rule of law. 
But what do we really mean by the rule of law ? In spite of the rights in the 
Constitution to whom everyone pays lip service in the Philippines, the goals 
of national security and economic development had been allowed to overrun 
individual rights. And yet all governmental policies had been and must be 
robed in legal dress. Everyone, including government officials, wishes to 
abide by a structure of legality. In a strange way, our people believe in the idea 
of law. Law plays the role of legitimizer of government policies, putting up a 
facade of legality to the processes that many times work out injustice among 
the people. Thus, repressive laws are laws and, therefore, must be obeyed. 
Is this what is meant by rule of law ? Is it simply a system that maintains 
law and order? If so, one can talk, like Don Carlos in Schiller's novel, of the 
peace and order of the churchyard. 
What I have to say may be strange, if not heretical, to western ears. The 
rule of law assumes the secure establishment of an operative legal system. It 
means a secure and procedurally regularized legal system aimed at ensuring 
justice to everyone... It is thus opposed to personal or arbitrary rule. 
Quoting Dicey, our Chief Justice stresses the conventional idea of the 
supremacy of law. 
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But supremacy of the rule of law refers not to just any kind of law. 
Rather, it envisions law that is just. Unjust laws are the worst instruments of 
tyranny. 
The fact is that the rule of law is a major virtue, surely a fundamental one, 
but nevertheless just one of the virtues which a legal system may possess and 
by which it is to be judged. It is not to be confused with democracy, justice, 
equality. It is a product of political power, reflecting and supporting social 
forces and interests. A non-democratic system which does not recognize that 
"all men are created equal", which suppresses dissent and uses force rather 
than reason and persuasion to command allegiance may, in principle, 
conform to the rule of law ; the South African legal system is the clearest 
example of this. No one who believes in the inherent dignity of the human 
being will say that it is better than the legal systems of constitutional 
democracies. Indeed, in that it reflects and supports an unjust social order, it 
is an immeasurably worse legal system, but it excels in one respect : in its 
conformity to the rule of law. 
2.2. Law, the Protector of the Strong 
To understand how law and human rights collide in the lives of the 
people of many developing societies, one should understand that law does not 
operate in a vacuum. Its nature and function, as well as its actual application, 
is culture-bound. That is why Gunnar Myrdal talks of Asian societies as being 
"soft states" in his monumental Asian Drama. He means the quality of 
application of the laws in Asian societies is substantially different from those 
in Western societies in spite of their commitment to the rule of law and to 
equal protection of the law in their Constitutions. 
Obedience to law is a hallmark of Western culture — overt obedience, at 
least. But in many developing countries, the majesty of the law is not seen in 
the same light as in a developed society. It is almost an abstract logical science 
in the West ; it is a body of rules in developing societies, the enforcement of 
which varies according to circumstances. Its implementation is negotiable. 
Most developing countries have placed economic growth and national 
security above all other goals. In the process, the ideals of justice and equality 
have been glossed over or in many cases even sacrificed. Or to paraphrase a 
human rights activist in Indonesia, "put in the waiting list for the coming 
decades." 
This policy has been achieved through law, for all government actions 
have somehow been justified on legal terms, i.e., they have been garbed in 
legal dress. 
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Indeed, under a regime of law — state law that is to say, law is the 
instrument by which order in society is maintained, interests balanced and 
social progress pursued. The people of Southeast Asia who have had the 
benefit of education have normally looked to law for the promotion of social 
justice, economic security, equality, and freedom. For in theory law secures 
justice for everyone. The reality, of course, can be different — at least, in the 
context of the lives of their people. Many times the law reflects and protects 
the interests of the predominant groups in society. 
One major reason for this is that the struggle for constitutionalism has 
occurred later in time in the developing countries than in the industrialized 
societies. It confronts remnants of feudalism and an elite mentality of 
paternalism in the developing societies while by and large, these are now past 
stages in the social and political histories of the industrialized societies. 
A society like the Philippines, which is plagued by a severe imbalance in 
the distribution of its wealth and income, is bound to develop a dual standard 
of justice ; one for the rich, and the other for the poor. There is, on one hand, 
an excess of individual freedom for a privileged minority and on the other 
hand a denial of it to the majority. 
3. The many Faces of Law in Southeast Asia 
The living law has many faces in Southeast Asia. Several aspects of the 
law and its enforcement are clearly discernible ; 
a) The law may be just and worthy of respect and obedience, especially if 
it calls for equal justice for all. But its implementation may partake of 
different standards for the strong and for the weak. Indeed, to think 
that because in constitutional theory a government of laws and not of 
men is supposed to prevail in these communities — they do not 
thereby have men enforcing the laws and making decisions for them 
— is a misunderstanding of the system by which men and women 
order their lives in civil society. Thus, many times it is law 
enforcement — and even its administration — that has resulted in the 
miscarriage of justice. 
b) One must understand that in some areas of the world, the 
governments themselves have been the major law-breakers e.g., the 
head of state, the military, the police, the internal revenue official, the 
forestry official, the ordinary bureaucrat. 
c) Finally — and this can be the worst of all situations — the law itself is 
what creates injustice or may be the instrument of oppression. This 
happens particularly when the rule of law so deeply embedded in 
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western constitutional theory, is transformed in much of the Third 
World into the law of the ruler and human rights are sacrificed 
because of the need of elites to perpetuate themselves in power or 
protect their privileged economic positions or both. 
Clearly, what is required is not simply the upholding of the existing law, 
for many legal rights — especially those rights arrogated by a repressive state 
against its own citizens — may be violative of human rights. 
It is also clear that human rights law becomes hostage to power structures 
in many communities. The people — citizens of these "democratic" societies 
— have been forced to regard themselves as instruments of a larger social 
purpose rather than as persons with the capacity to make decisions for 
themselves about their own situations. 
Ultimately, what we are talking about is power, not just really pure law. 
Power structures and relationships determine development and underdevel-
opment both among and within nations, and human rights are clearly a 
hostage to power structures and relationships in the repressive regimes, where 
dictatorial governments have clothed themselves in constitutional dress and 
where law, whether despotic or constitutional in form, is clearly administered 
on the side of the strong. 
Our President, Mrs. Aquino, has put into words what many people have 
felt about our glorious revolution : 
A non-violent victory of freedom over a government supported by the army is 
rare in history. A victory of freedom which comes about through the protection 
of the military by the population is unprecedented. 
It takes more than good intentions or an anti-Marcos ideology, however, 
to bring under control a country wrecked by crises. It is an undisputed fact that 
the economy of the country, savaged by the Marcos Government for 20 years, 
has yet to take any discernible upturn. Abject poverty continues to reign, 
particularly in the countryside where 70 per cent of the population lives. 
One prospective destabilizing factor on the road back to democratic 
processes is the military. 
The rapid expansion of the military since 1972 had enabled it to acquire 
political power. The disbandment of Congress, suspension of the electoral 
process, arrest and detention of leading traditional politicians, and 
proscription of political parties and their activities, facilitated the military's 
acquisition of political power. 
The end of the constitutional dictatorship of Marcos did not diminish 
the high visibility of the military. In a sense, it has increased further in the new 
regime. For it was the military (or one segment of it) which had acted as the 
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catalyst of the postelection crisis by staging the rebellion that sparked the 
street revolution. For having performed that admirable role, the rejuvenated 
armed forces will, for weal or for woe, be assured of a more influential 
position in public affairs. 
Finally, the continuing problem of lack of participation of all the people 
in the political and administrative processes, as a concomitant of the existing 
inequality of wealth and power in the Philippines, continues. 
Neither the cabinet nor the members of the Constitutional Commission 
show any significant participation by the peasantry or working classes. 
Although their mass and creativeness in street action was mainly responsible 
for the success of the revolution, it looks like those in the lower rung of the 
Philippine social pyramid will remain the fodder of revolutions. 
Conventional republican principles of government were what did not 
work out too well in the Philippines political landscape since the turn of the 
century, given the great social and economic inequalities long existent in the 
country. Local elites had continued to dominate the legislative process — and 
even constitution — framing. 
In the wake of the February storm, the structures that bred social and not 
merely political discontent stand intact and operational. Traditional political 
parties even if now coming in new guise and carrying new labels, have served 
to keep the masses out of power by making elections intra-elite contests. 
Ultimately, an authentic democratic process for the Philippines is, or 
should be a liberating process which will create conditions for peoples, 
particularly those at present oppressed and marginalized, to identify their 
own needs, mobilize their own resources and shape their own future. Only 
then can there be lasting security. This is still a dream that awaits realization. 
